Do not approach munitions
under any circumstances →
Country or territory where the image was reported

Reported Location (52)

Year the image is reported to have been taken

Year (21)

Classification groups of key explosive munitions used in conflicts

Munition Category (8)

The impact or effect the munition is intended to have

Functional use (10)

The specific model of munition pictured

Tentative Model (353)

Search

The external organisation that documented the munition

Research Organisation (6)

Colour of the munition pictured

Base Colour (12)

Colour of all, or some, of the markings on the munition

Marking Colour (11)

Language or script of the marking on a munition

Marking Script (10)

Condition of the munition pictured

Condition (6)

The munition has not operated and the intended effect has not occurred.
Unfunctioned Munition
✕
Key features defining the operation mechanisms of a projectile

Mechanical Feature (10)

Whether a munition is guided or unguided

Guidance (2)

Where the munition is launched from and what it targets

Domain (7)

The type of fins visible on the munition

Fins Characteristic (6)

The nominal diameter of a projectile. For most modern munitions, this is expressed in millimetres (e.g. 82 mm mortar projectile), but older artillery gun projectiles may be described in inches.

Calibre (76)

Weight class of the aerial bomb pictured

Weight Class (14)

× Clear all filters
1–100 of 1,026

Current Filter

Unfunctioned Munition
The munition has not operated and the intended effect has not occurred.
OSMP2271
Mine Submunition Ukraine PTM-3
Analyst Note:
This image shows a PTM-3 scatterable anti-vehicle mine, surrounded by the remnants of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Russia has been dispensing PTM-3 mines from one-way attack UAVs as they fly towards their primary target. Typically, these OWA UAVs are fitted with KPTM-3 remote mining canisters mounted under the wings, which eject their PTM-3 payload midair. The PTM-3’s fuze features an arming delay which is sufficient to allow the mine to fall to the ground before fully activating. (ARES)
OSMP2217
Submunition Iran [TEMP] ARES-TMID-0012
Analyst Note:
This image shows an Iranian ballistic missile’s ‘manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle’ (MaRV; a detachable, steerable payload section) at the IRGC Aerospace Museum in Tehran, with what appear to be inert models of the submunitions Iran has deployed against Israel in the recent conflict. ARES has assigned a temporary identification of TMID-0012 to these submunitions. (ARES)
OSMP2407
Rocket or Missile Sudan [TEMP] ARES-TMID-0013
Analyst Note:
This image shows an unknown model of one-way attack (OWA) UAV believed to be produced by the UAE, and employed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. Unlike TMID-0014 and TMID-0015, this UAV uses a 82 mm mortar projectile fitted in the nose, rather than a Modamer warhead. (ARES)
OSMP2385
Rocket or Missile Iran [TEMP] ARES-TMID-0015
Analyst Note:
The colour of this image appears more yellow than would be expected, perhaps as a result of a digital filter. In other images of the same remnants, the Modamer warheads pictured here appear to be grey, rather than tan. (ARES)
OSMP2387
Rocket or Missile Iran [TEMP] ARES-TMID-0015
Analyst Note:
This image shows remnants of several one-way attack UAVs, as well as two unfunctioned Modamer warheads. Modamer warheads are blast/fragmentation warheads with an overall weight of 34.5 kg (76 lb). The Modamer warhead designs are produced by Halcon, a subsidiary of Edge Group, which is owned by the Emirati state. (ARES)
OSMP2389
Rocket or Missile Iran [TEMP] ARES-TMID-0015
Analyst Note:
This image shows an unknown model of one-way attack (OWA) UAV believed to be produced and employed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). ARES has assigned a temporary munitions identifier (TMID) of TMID-0015 to this munition. The UAV’s nose and a Modamer warhead can be seen, detached, to the left of the main body. (ARES)
OSMP2456
Mine Lebanon YM-3
Analyst Note:
This image shows two anti-vehicle mines produced by Iran, known variously as the ’YM3’, ‘YM-III’, or similar. According to the manufacturer, mass production began in 2002. The mine reportedly has an overall weight of 6.9 kg (15 lb). (ARES)
OSMP2455
Mine Lebanon M18A1
Analyst Note:
This image shows an Iranian M18A1 anti-personnel landmine, an Iranian copy of the American M18A1 ‘Claymore’ design. Iran has produced their own copy of the M18A1 since at least 2004. According to Iranian sources, it contains 600 spherical, steel pre-formed fragments that are 6 mm in diameter. These mines are designed to propel these steel balls in an arc forward of the munition upon detonation. (ARES)
OSMP2315
Rocket or Missile R-73 R-73EL
Analyst Note:
This photo shows a Russian Air Force Su-35 (RF-81718), which, alongside another Russian aircraft, intercepted a UK Royal Air Force aircraft in international airspace over the Black Sea. This image, published by the Royal Air Force, provides an opportunity to view a ‘live’ Su-35 load-out in detail. (ARES)
OSMP1963
Rocket or Missile Afghanistan K40 A3
Analyst Note:
This image shows the transport and launch container of a British surface-to-air missile from the Blowpipe/Javelin/Starburst family. (The container’s larger diameter, which houses the fins, can be partially seen.) The Blowpipe family of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) use a separate acquisition package that clips onto the missile launcher, reducing the weight and complexity of the missile itself. Various models incorporate different blast/fragmentation and shaped-charge warheads. The National Stock Number (NSN), 1410-99-966-9045, identifies the U.K. as the country of origin (“99”). (ARES)
OSMP2397
Rocket or Missile Sudan [TEMP] ARES-TMID-0014
Analyst Note:
The fuze installed in this Modamer warhead appears to be the Serbian UT M18, which is commonly installed in the “120mm TB” thermobaric air-delivered bomb. The 120mm TB resembles a mortar projectile (see OSMP 1803 & 1812), but is commonly dropped from UAVs. Both the 120mm TB and the UT M18 fuze are known to have been purchased by the armed forces of the UAE, and shipments marked for delivery to the UAE have been documented in Sudan. (ARES)
OSMP2328
Rocket or Missile Syria KP-M-112mm
Analyst Note:
From early 2026, rockets marked “KP-M-112mm” began appearing in media reports from Syria. The manufacturer and country of origin of these is not yet known. Visually, these munitions closely resemble the Chinese Type 63 family of rockets (which includes the Iranian FAJR 1, often seen in Syria). However, the markings indicate an apparent 112 mm diameter, which is larger than the 107 mm of the Type 63 family. There are other, minor differences in construction that are externally visible. (ARES)
OSMP2374
Rocket or Missile Yemen Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG
Analyst Note:
This image shows a munition shortly before impact. While the quality of the image is not high enough to conclusively identify the munition, remnants of a Storm Shadow/SCALP EG missile were recovered following this strike, supporting a more precise identification. Whilst Saudi Arabia has denied conducting this strike, and the Yemeni Army has claimed responsibility, Saudi Arabia is known to possess Storm Shadow/SCALP EG missiles and the capability to deploy them, whereas the Yemeni Army is not known to possess or use this weapon. (ARES)
OSMP1908
Recoilless Munition Thailand PF69-40 HEI
Analyst Note:
The PF69-40 HEI warhead contains approximately 900 pieces of spherical steel fragmentation (‘ball bearings’) as well as 2,000–3,000 incendiary pellets that scatter over a 15 m radius on detonation. (ARES)
OSMP1910
Recoilless Munition Thailand B40 HE
Analyst Note:
The items highlighted in this image are Vietnamese 70 mm B40 recoilless gun projectiles. The B40 HE is an anti-personnel munition that is fired from the Vietnamese B40 recoilless gun, a copy of the Soviet RPG-2. (ARES)
OSMP1752
Rocket or Missile Sudan
Analyst Note:
Based on design features and an estimation of the munition’s apparent size relative to the personnel handling it, this image appears to show a 122 mm surface-to-surface rocket fitted with a high explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) warhead, although the specific model and country of origin are unclear. In Sudan there have been reports of Russian, Chinese, and domestically produced (Taka-02) 122 mm rockets being used. (ARES)
OSMP2284
Mine Submunition Ukraine ADAM / M67 / M72
Analyst Note:
This image shows a U.S. Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM), an anti-personnel scatterable landmine which is dispensed from the rear of M692 and M731 155 mm artillery gun projectiles. Each projectile contains 36 ADAM submunitions. The submunition can deploy up to seven tripwires out to 20 ft (6.1 m). Any movement of a tripwire or movement of the ADAM body will result in a small kill mechanism being ejected to a height of a 6–8 ft (1.8 m–2.4 m) prior to detonating. Each munition contains a small amount of depleted uranium. The ADAM was previously designated as either the M67 or M72, with the only difference being the self-destruct time delay. (ARES)
OSMP2283
Mine Submunition Ukraine DM1399
Analyst Note:
The German DM 1399 (AT2) anti-tank landmine shown here can be dispensed from rockets and ground vehicles. Upon being dispensed, a small parachute is deployed in order to slow the mine’s descent and assist in in landing base down; the parachute is released upon impact by an impact-release connector. Upon impact, from five to 12 (six shown) spring-loaded, metal legs deploy to right the mine; arming is completed anywhere from 15 seconds to five minutes thereafter. The base of the cylindrical body houses the battery and electronics assembly, with the main explosive charge and Misnay–Schardin shaped charge plate immediately above. The body is topped by a dome cover and an S3 sensor wire which extends approximately 600 mm (12 in) above the body of the mine. (ARES)
OSMP2282
Mine Submunition Ukraine DM1399
Analyst Note:
This image shows a German DM 1399 (AT2) dispensed anti-tank (anti-vehicle) landmine. This munition uses a shaped charge that relies on the Misnay–Schardin effect to penetrate the underside of armoured fighting vehicles. The DM 1399 reportedly has magnetic and pressure fuzing, along with an anti-disturbance feature and a self-destruct time delay of up to four days, settable in six different increments. The mines can be dispensed from rockets (MLRS), vehicles (Skorpion 2), and UAVs (Eggbox with 4 mines). Currently the mines are known to be in service with Finland, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine (having been donated by Germany). Denmark, Latvia, and Sweden are in the process of having AT2+ mines and Skorpion 2 systems delivered. (ARES)