Featured Materials
A curated selection of images, terms and collections to help understand modern conflict.
Iran War 2026
Munition images from the ongoing Middle East conflict
Shahed-131 & -136 UAV
3D models explain the best-known 'kamikaze drones'
Collection
Munition images from the Gaza war
GBU-39 bomb
3D model explaining Israel's 'weapon of choice' in Gaza
Research organisation
Images from the Human Rights Watch archives
Collection
Munition images from the Ukraine war
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Submit images to the OSMP
OSMP referenced in media and research
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BBC uses OSMP to investigate new U.S. missile
NYT uses OSMP to identify Iran school munition
AP highlights images of Iranian submunitions
The Incendiary Bomb Never Seen in Israel Before
UN report highlights OSMP importance
GIJN’s Top Investigative Tools of 2024
How GBU-39 bombs became Israel’s ‘weapon of choice’
1–100 of 1,813
Analyst Note:
This image shows remnants of a Guided Advanced Tactical Rocket (GATR) alongside the remnants of a Hydra-70 series rocket. Developed and produced by Elbit Systems of Israel, GATR adds advanced capabilities, including guidance, to ‘dumb’ Hydra-70 rockets, in similar fashion to the U.S. APKWS system. GATR replaces the fins typically found in Hydra-70 series rockets with those of a new design. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows a Chinese Type 70-series rocket being removed from its launch tube. The example in the picture is a high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) variant likely designed for export; other Type 70 HEAT variants are known, as is a bounding high explosive fragmentation (HE/FRAG) variant. This family of rockets is fired from the Type 70 and Type 70-1 shoulder-fired launchers. The each rocket is contained in a disposable launch tube which is attached to the rear of the launcher and discarded after firing. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows a downed Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) one-way attack (OWA) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Unlike LUCAS UAVs see previously, this example does not have a Starshield GPS Antenna prominently visible forward of the engines, indicating that this LUCAS has been constructed differently to previous examples. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows a PTM-3 scatterable anti-vehicle mine, surrounded by the remnants of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Russia has been dispensing PTM-3 mines from one-way attack UAVs as they fly towards their primary target. Typically, these OWA UAVs are fitted with KPTM-3 remote mining canisters mounted under the wings, which eject their PTM-3 payload midair. The PTM-3’s fuze features an arming delay which is sufficient to allow the mine to fall to the ground before fully activating. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows a functioned AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) air-to-surface missile. Upon functioning, a flexible linear shaped charge (FLSC) is used to cut open the munition body, dispensing 145 BLU-97B/B submunitions. The clean-cut edges visible on the bottom hanging section of the JSOW are the hallmark of the functioning of the FLSC. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows an Iranian ballistic missile’s ‘manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle’ (MaRV; a detachable, steerable payload section) at the IRGC Aerospace Museum in Tehran, with what appear to be inert models of the submunitions Iran has deployed against Israel in the recent conflict. ARES has assigned a temporary identification of TMID-0012 to these submunitions. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows an unknown model of one-way attack (OWA) UAV believed to be produced by the UAE, and employed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. Unlike TMID-0014 and TMID-0015, this UAV uses a 82 mm mortar projectile fitted in the nose, rather than a Modamer warhead. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows a TMID-0013 UAV being displayed by the UAE during the ‘Desert Tiger 7’ joint exercise conducted with Malaysia in February 2023. The other UAV in the image has been temporarily designated TMID-0014. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
The 81 mm mortar projectile which serves as the warhead for the TMID-0014 is partially visible protruding from the nose of this example. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
The colour of this image appears more yellow than would be expected, perhaps as a result of a digital filter. In other images of the same remnants, the Modamer warheads pictured here appear to be grey, rather than tan. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows remnants of several one-way attack UAVs, as well as two unfunctioned Modamer warheads. Modamer warheads are blast/fragmentation warheads with an overall weight of 34.5 kg (76 lb). The Modamer warhead designs are produced by Halcon, a subsidiary of Edge Group, which is owned by the Emirati state. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows an unknown model of one-way attack (OWA) UAV believed to be produced and employed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). ARES has assigned a temporary munitions identifier (TMID) of TMID-0015 to this munition. The UAV’s nose and a Modamer warhead can be seen, detached, to the left of the main body. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows the open warhead compartment of the UAV, forward of the fuel tank, with a frame that fits the Modamer warhead. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows the body panel of the UAV which covers the compartment inside which the Modamer warhead is fitted. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows what appears to be an earlier variant of the current iteration of the TMID-0014 which has been used by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. This model of UAV was also documented in Yemen in 2022. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows two anti-vehicle mines produced by Iran, known variously as the ’YM3’, ‘YM-III’, or similar. According to the manufacturer, mass production began in 2002. The mine reportedly has an overall weight of 6.9 kg (15 lb). (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows an Iranian M18A1 anti-personnel landmine, an Iranian copy of the American M18A1 ‘Claymore’ design. Iran has produced their own copy of the M18A1 since at least 2004. According to Iranian sources, it contains 600 spherical, steel pre-formed fragments that are 6 mm in diameter. These mines are designed to propel these steel balls in an arc forward of the munition upon detonation. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This photo shows a Russian Air Force Su-35 (RF-81718), which, alongside another Russian aircraft, intercepted a UK Royal Air Force aircraft in international airspace over the Black Sea. This image, published by the Royal Air Force, provides an opportunity to view a ‘live’ Su-35 load-out in detail. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows the transport and launch container of a British surface-to-air missile from the Blowpipe/Javelin/Starburst family. (The container’s larger diameter, which houses the fins, can be partially seen.) The Blowpipe family of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) use a separate acquisition package that clips onto the missile launcher, reducing the weight and complexity of the missile itself. Various models incorporate different blast/fragmentation and shaped-charge warheads. The National Stock Number (NSN), 1410-99-966-9045, identifies the U.K. as the country of origin (“99”). (ARES)
Analyst Note:
The fuze installed in this Modamer warhead appears to be the Serbian UT M18, which is commonly installed in the “120mm TB” thermobaric air-delivered bomb. The 120mm TB resembles a mortar projectile (see OSMP 1803 & 1812), but is commonly dropped from UAVs. Both the 120mm TB and the UT M18 fuze are known to have been purchased by the armed forces of the UAE, and shipments marked for delivery to the UAE have been documented in Sudan. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
From early 2026, rockets marked “KP-M-112mm” began appearing in media reports from Syria. The manufacturer and country of origin of these is not yet known. Visually, these munitions closely resemble the Chinese Type 63 family of rockets (which includes the Iranian FAJR 1, often seen in Syria). However, the markings indicate an apparent 112 mm diameter, which is larger than the 107 mm of the Type 63 family. There are other, minor differences in construction that are externally visible. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
This image shows a munition shortly before impact. While the quality of the image is not high enough to conclusively identify the munition, remnants of a Storm Shadow/SCALP EG missile were recovered following this strike, supporting a more precise identification.
Whilst Saudi Arabia has denied conducting this strike, and the Yemeni Army has claimed responsibility, Saudi Arabia is known to possess Storm Shadow/SCALP EG missiles and the capability to deploy them, whereas the Yemeni Army is not known to possess or use this weapon. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
The PF69-40 HEI warhead contains approximately 900 pieces of spherical steel fragmentation (‘ball bearings’) as well as 2,000–3,000 incendiary pellets that scatter over a 15 m radius on detonation. (ARES)
Analyst Note:
The items highlighted in this image are Vietnamese 70 mm B40 recoilless gun projectiles. The B40 HE is an anti-personnel munition that is fired from the Vietnamese B40 recoilless gun, a copy of the Soviet RPG-2. (ARES)
