Do not approach munitions
under any circumstances
Country or territory where the image was reported

Reported Location (52)

Year the image is reported to have been taken

Year (21)

Classification groups of key explosive munitions used in conflicts

Munition Category (8)

The impact or effect the munition is intended to have

Functional use (10)

Use the detonation of an explosive to propel small fragments of material from the body of the munition at high velocity
Fragmentation Munition
The specific model of munition pictured

Tentative Model (352)

Search

The external organisation that documented the munition

Research Organisation (6)

Colour of the munition pictured

Base Colour (12)

Colour of all, or some, of the markings on the munition

Marking Colour (11)

Language or script of the marking on a munition

Marking Script (10)

Condition of the munition pictured

Condition (6)

Key features defining the operation mechanisms of a projectile

Mechanical Feature (10)

Whether a munition is guided or unguided

Guidance (2)

Where the munition is launched from and what it targets

Domain (7)

The type of fins visible on the munition

Fins Characteristic (6)

The nominal diameter of a projectile. For most modern munitions, this is expressed in millimetres (e.g. 82 mm mortar projectile), but older artillery gun projectiles may be described in inches.

Calibre (76)

Weight class of the aerial bomb pictured

Weight Class (14)

401–500 of 1,133

Current Filter

Fragmentation Munition
Fragmentation munitions use the detonation of an explosive to propel small fragments of material (‘fragmentation’) from the body of the munition at high velocity. A fragmentation munition typically affects a wider area than a simple blast munition of the same size, and is effective against personnel and unarmoured vehicles. Fragmentation is the primary mechanism of lethality for many common explosive munitions, but these munitions almost invariably also affect their environment through blast and other mechanisms (e.g., a high explosive fragmentation munition).
OSMP1528
Analyst Note:
This image shows a Russian spherical submunition of unknown designation. Whilst this specific example was delivered by a cluster munition variant of the Kh-59MK2 missile, this submunition is known to also be delivered by variants of the Kh-69. A similar, but different, spherical submunition is delivered by some variants of the Kh-101. (ARES)
OSMP1225
Analyst Note:
This image shows the remnants of an unknown Israeli munition that was used in a strike that hit the Nasser hospital in Gaza. The turbojet engine, along with possible wing remnants indicate that this could be a one-way attack UAV or ‘loitering munition’, consistent with some reporting on the strikes. This same model of munition has been used in multiple strikes in Gaza, as well as in Lebanon and Syria. There is no publicly disclosed Israeli munition that neatly matches these remnants. OSMP entries 1384, 1385, 1386, and 1389 show other incidents in which this munition appears to have been used. (ARES)
OSMP1549
Analyst Note:
This image shows one of the actuated fins of a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kit. The manufacturer CAGE code (“76301”) and the part number (“70P862100-1005”) are visible. This CAGE code corresponds to Boeing, the manufacturer of the JDAM guidance kit, while the part number corresponds to a fin of a JDAM kit compatible with MK-84 and BLU-109 2,000-pound-class air-delivered bombs. (ARES).
OSMP1471
Analyst Note:
This image shows a remnant of the tail actuation section of a SPICE 250 guided bomb. The control fins are normally attached to this section, and the attachment point for one control fin is visible. (ARES)
OSMP1475
Analyst Note:
This image shows a remnant of the outer casing of the “S250 OPTIC” or SPICE 250 guided bomb, with the markings relatively intact. The markings on this remnant show that, while classified as a 250-pound bomb, the actual weight of this SPICE 250 variant is 288 pounds (131 kg) with only 18.5 pounds (8.4 kg) of explosive material. (ARES)
OSMP1462
Analyst Note:
This image shows a remnant of the control section of the Arrow 2 ‘kill vehicle’, including the control fins. The blast-fragmentation warhead is located in the front section of the kill vehicle, forward of the control section, and is absent here due to the functioned state of the munition. (ARES)
OSMP1437
Analyst Note:
This image shows a unexploded Iranian submunition pictured in an awareness poster made by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Home Front Command. The poster warns people to not touch or disturb the submunition. The IDF reported that about 20 of these submunitions were deployed by a single Iranian ballistic missile, spreading over a radius of 8 kilometres. (ARES)
OSMP1436
Analyst Note:
This image shows an unexploded submunition that was deployed by an Iranian medium-range ballistic missile over Israel. Inert variants of these submunitions were previously observed in an Iranian city following a failed missile test. (ARES)
OSMP1227
Analyst Note:
The source for this entry reports that these remnants were left behind after the missiles were “recycled“. Explosive remnants of war (ERW) are often recycled for the value of their scrap metal, or ‘harvested’ by militant groups for the explosive material. These recycling attempts may result in the ERW exploding, potentially killing or injuring people. (ARES)
OSMP1035
Analyst Note:
This image shows two BLU-108 submunitions. Each BLU-108 contains 4 smaller submunitions, or ‘skeets’. The BLU-108 at the top has deployed all four skeets, while the bottom example has two skeets still attached. The BLU-108 is fitted with a parachute that is deployed after the submunition separates from its dispenser (e.g., the CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapon) to slow its descent, as well as a rocket motor that is thereafter fired to increase the munition’s altitude before it deploys the skeets. Each skeet is able to independently seek out targets using an infrared sensor. (ARES)
OSMP1369
Analyst Note:
This is the data plate fitted to an Israeli Air Force bomb guidance kit. It reads “3 זִקִית” (‘Zikit 3’, or ‘Chameleon 3’ in English). As of May 2025, there is no public information available about this model of bomb guidance kit, but it appears to be a derivative or variant of the Israeli Lizard series, which are derived from the American Paveway bomb guidance kit. (ARES)
OSMP1370
Analyst Note:
This image shows the damaged aerofoil group, or ‘tail kit’, found with a Chameleon 3 bomb guidance kit. The exact model of aerofoil group is unknown, but in US service similar component groups are given a designation in the ‘MXU-xxx’ range, and are interchangeable with different variants of the Paveway bomb guidance kit (within bomb weight classes). (ARES).
OSMP1230
Analyst Note:
Although Human Rights Watch reported that they found manufacturing markings on a guidance fin assembly indicating that this MXU-series aerofoil group was paired with a Paveway III guidance kit, this cannot be determined by this wing remnant from the aerofoil group alone. (ARES)
OSMP1095
Analyst Note:
This image shows fragments of a BLU-109C/B 2,000-pound penetrator bomb. The remnant with visible threads is part of the aft closure ring attached to the base of the bomb. This features nine vent holes as an ‘insensitive munition’ (IM) safety feature. Three of the threaded vent holes are visible on this fragment. (ARES)
OSMP1401
Analyst Note:
The munition in this image has been integrated into a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) small UAV. This UAV (‘drone’) adds powered and guided delivery and converts the munition into a guided missile—regardless of the original, intended delivery method. (ARES)
OSMP1403
Analyst Note:
The warhead of the OWA UAV indicated in this image cannot be positively identified from this photograph alone. It appears to be the warhead section of either an OG-9 series or OG-15 series high explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) projectile, with a GO-2 or similar impact fuze fitted in the nose. (ARES)