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Country or territory where the image was reported

Reported Location (48)

A large country in the Middle East experiencing ongoing violence
Iraq
The areas internationally recognised as the basis of a future independent Palestinian state
Palestinian Territories
Year the image is reported to have been taken

Year (20)

Classification groups of key explosive munitions used in conflicts

Munition Category (8)

The impact or effect the munition is intended to have

Functional use (10)

The specific model of munition pictured

Tentative Model (366)

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The external organisation that documented the munition

Research Organisation (6)

Colour of the munition pictured

Base Colour (12)

Colour of all, or some, of the markings on the munition

Marking Colour (11)

Language or script of the marking on a munition

Marking Script (9)

Condition of the munition pictured

Condition (6)

Key features defining the operation mechanisms of a projectile

Mechanical Feature (10)

Whether a munition is guided or unguided

Guidance (2)

Where the munition is launched from and what it targets

Domain (7)

The type of fins visible on the munition

Fins Characteristic (5)

The nominal diameter of a projectile. For most modern munitions, this is expressed in millimetres (e.g. 82 mm mortar projectile), but older artillery gun projectiles may be described in inches.

Calibre (72)

Weight class of the aerial bomb pictured

Weight Class (14)

1–100 of 230

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Iraq
A large country in the Middle East affected by conflict since a 2003 US-led invasion to overthrow dictatorial President Saddam Hussein. Since 2013 the Iraqi military, with the military support of a US-led Coalition, has fought the so-called Islamic State, while conflict between often sectarian militias continues. Turkey also conducts regular strikes against Kurdish militants in northern Iraq.

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Palestinian Territories
The areas internationally recognised as the basis of a future independent Palestinian state, primarily the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Israel has fought multiple wars with the Hamas militant group, which controlled Gaza.
OSMP2186
Analyst Note:
This image shows the launch of an Iranian Paveh surface-to-surface cruise missile in Iraq. The munition was fired by Iranian proxy forces and reportedly targeting Israel. Some sources indicate the Paveh has been renamed the ‘Jamal-10’, whilst others claim it is being locally produced in Iraq by Iranian proxy forces. With an estimated 75% of the missile’s components coming from outside Iran, distributed production is certainly possible. The missile has two large wings located forward of the munition’s midpoint, three smaller fins towards the tail, and four actuated fins around the tail. The initial launch is accomplished with a solid-propellant rocket motor, which gives way to a turbo jet flight motor mounted on top of the missile, towards the tail. (ARES)
OSMP2024
Analyst Note:
This image shows a Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS). The LUCAS one-way attack UAV is a U.S.-made, cost-effective ‘kamikaze drone’. LUCAS munitions can connect to one another via a mesh network, allowing multiple LUCAS drones to communicate in flight. The white square object connected to the munition by a cable appears to be a Starlink antenna, consistent with reported communication capabilities. Elon Musk has claimed that LUCAS operates only via Starshield, a Starlink-derived satellite network intended for government use. (ARES)

Collection

The Iran War 2026

Verified munition images from all parties to the regional conflict sparked by U.S. and Israeli strikes on 28 February, 2026

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OSMP1960
Analyst Note:
The Iranian 358 surface-to-air missile is reportedly a ‘loitering munition’, designed for engaging drones and rotary-wing aircraft. It employs a combination of ground-based and onboard thermal cameras to scan a designated area, and then uses an infrared imaging seeker in the nose to locate and lock onto targets. The missile carries a 10 kg fragmentation warhead, which is functioned by a 360-degree laser proximity sensor. (ARES)

Collection

Ірансько-ізраїльський конфлікт. Червень 2025 року

Десятки перевірених зображень боєприпасів, використаних Іраном та Ізраїлем під час конфлікту між Ізраїлем та Іраном у червні 2025 року

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Collection

Ізраїль і Газа 2023 – 2026

7 жовтня 2023 року бойовики ХАМАС прорвали міцно укріплений кордон між Ізраїлем і Сектором Газа, атакувавши численні міста і села. За повідомленнями, в Ізраїлі загинуло понад 1000 осіб, а понад 250 було взято в заручники і перевезено до Гази

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OSMP1678
Analyst Note:
In this case, the tentative identification of this munition is possible based on an analysis of its silhouette, particularly the distinctive detachable warhead compartment that can be seen hanging from the base of the munition's body. In many cases, such an identification technique would not be possible to apply with confidence. (ARES)
OSMP1381
Analyst Note:
This image shows the damaged rocket motor section of a ballistic missile that was fired by the Houthis in Yemen towards Israel and likely intercepted. The Houthis employ ballistic missiles that are supplied by Iran, and given different names. In Houthi service, the Iranian Kheibar Shekan missile is known as the Hatem-2. (ARES)
OSMP1650
Analyst Note:
This image shows parts from at least three fin-stabilised tank gun projectiles, including the tail assemblies and several folding fins. These are components that often survive relatively intact following the functioning of such munitions. The specific morphology of the remnants pictured is consistent with Israeli 120 mm tank gun projectiles. Contextual information suggests that the remnants are most likely to be from M339 high explosive ‘multi-purpose’ projectiles. (ARES)
OSMP1457
Analyst Note:
This image shows an Israeli-made 122 mm rocket motor found following a strike on Amr School in Gaza City. Although it is not possible to be definitive from this image alone, it is likely that this rocket motor was part of an Israeli ‘Bar’ missile, a guided munition designed for precision strikes in urban areas that uses a 122 mm rocket motor. (ARES)
OSMP1224
Analyst Note:
This image shows the remnants of an unknown Israeli munition that was used in a strike on Nasser hospital. Reporting on these strikes often refers to this munition as a ‘drone’. The turbojet engine, along with possible wing remnants, indicate that this could be a one-way-attack (OWA) UAV or ‘loitering munition’ missile, consistent with reporting. This same model of munition has been used multiple times in strikes in Gaza, as well as Lebanon and Syria. There is no publicly acknowledged Israeli munition that closely fits these remnants. Entries 1384, 1385, 1386, and 1389 capture other incidents in which this munition was used. (ARES)
OSMP1225
Analyst Note:
This image shows the remnants of an unknown Israeli munition that was used in a strike that hit the Nasser hospital in Gaza. The turbojet engine, along with possible wing remnants indicate that this could be a one-way attack UAV or ‘loitering munition’, consistent with some reporting on the strikes. This same model of munition has been used in multiple strikes in Gaza, as well as in Lebanon and Syria. There is no publicly disclosed Israeli munition that neatly matches these remnants. OSMP entries 1384, 1385, 1386, and 1389 show other incidents in which this munition appears to have been used. (ARES)

Collection

Iran-Israel conflict June 2025

Dozens of verified images of munitions used by Iran and Israel during the June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict

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OSMP1462
Analyst Note:
This image shows a remnant of the control section of the Arrow 2 ‘kill vehicle’, including the control fins. The blast-fragmentation warhead is located in the front section of the kill vehicle, forward of the control section, and is absent here due to the functioned state of the munition. (ARES)
OSMP1369
Analyst Note:
This is the data plate fitted to an Israeli Air Force bomb guidance kit. It reads “3 זִקִית” (‘Zikit 3’, or ‘Chameleon 3’ in English). As of May 2025, there is no public information available about this model of bomb guidance kit, but it appears to be a derivative or variant of the Israeli Lizard series, which are derived from the American Paveway bomb guidance kit. (ARES)
OSMP1370
Analyst Note:
This image shows the damaged aerofoil group, or ‘tail kit’, found with a Chameleon 3 bomb guidance kit. The exact model of aerofoil group is unknown, but in US service similar component groups are given a designation in the ‘MXU-xxx’ range, and are interchangeable with different variants of the Paveway bomb guidance kit (within bomb weight classes). (ARES).
OSMP1354
Analyst Note:
This image shows the remnants of a SkyStriker one-way attack UAV, manufactured by Elbit Systems of Israel. The SkyStriker can be fitted with various warhead options, including dual-purpose warheads weighing 5 or 10 kilograms. While it appears that a reconstruction was attempted with the remnants, the placement of the various components does not accurately represent an intact SkyStriker. (ARES)
OSMP1246
Analyst Note:
This image shows the flare from a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system's ‘Talon’ kinetic interceptor missile. The flare is located at the aft end of the missile's booster engine. The ‘petals’ of the flare are initially flush, and are actuated into the deployed position, seen here, as part of the missile‘s functioning. (ARES)
OSMP1238
Analyst Note:
This image shows a fragment of the “inner petal assembly” of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system’s ‘Talon’ interceptor missile. The part number for the assembly (“23917ASSY1A62803-101 REV.E / E”), Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code (“07554”), manufacturer abbreviation (“CTL”), and serial number (“S/N DDLKD”) are visible. This CAGE code and manufacturer abbreviation are associated with CTL Aerospace Inc, a subcontractor for Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the THAAD system. It is not uncommon for complex munitions to be made by several different manufacturers, and thus multiple CAGE codes may be present as a result of the various subcontractors. (ARES)