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Country or territory where the image was reported

Reported Location (48)

A large eastern European country invaded by Russia in February 2022
Ukraine
Year the image is reported to have been taken

Year (20)

Classification groups of key explosive munitions used in conflicts

Munition Category (8)

The impact or effect the munition is intended to have

Functional use (10)

The specific model of munition pictured

Tentative Model (366)

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The external organisation that documented the munition

Research Organisation (6)

Colour of the munition pictured

Base Colour (12)

Colour of all, or some, of the markings on the munition

Marking Colour (11)

Language or script of the marking on a munition

Marking Script (9)

Condition of the munition pictured

Condition (6)

Key features defining the operation mechanisms of a projectile

Mechanical Feature (10)

Whether a munition is guided or unguided

Guidance (2)

Where the munition is launched from and what it targets

Domain (7)

The type of fins visible on the munition

Fins Characteristic (5)

The nominal diameter of a projectile. For most modern munitions, this is expressed in millimetres (e.g. 82 mm mortar projectile), but older artillery gun projectiles may be described in inches.

Calibre (72)

Weight class of the aerial bomb pictured

Weight Class (14)

101–200 of 665

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Ukraine
A large eastern European country that faced a full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. Since then the Ukrainian military has fought a major war with Russian forces, with tens of thousands believed to have been killed.
OSMP1643
Analyst Note:
This photo shows some of the lithium-ion power banks found within a Gerbera UAV. These are used to power the onboard avionics, control surfaces, communications hardware, camera, and other components. The quantity and type of batteries fitted to the Gerbera will often vary based on the role for which the UAV has been configured—one-way attack (OWA; i.e., a ‘sacrificial’ munition), reconnaissance, signal relay, or decoy—and which specific hardware has been installed to effect this mission. (ARES)
OSMP1642
Analyst Note:
This photo shows the fuel bladder of a Gerbera UAV, which still contains some fuel. It is likely that a bladder is used—rather than a rigid tank—to save on both weight and cost. Some variants of the Gerbera have been observed to be fitted with a second bladder in the forward section of the fuselage, serving to extend the UAV’s range. (ARES)
OSMP1647
Analyst Note:
The DLE60 two-stroke petrol (gasoline) engine pictured here is the standard engine found on Gerbera UAVs. It is produced by the Chinese company Mile Haoxiang Technology Co., Ltd. and marketed specifically for use in UAVs. Although the Gerbera is manufactured in Russia, the engine and many other key components continue to be supplied from Chinese sources. (ARES)
OSMP1648
Analyst Note:
This image shows a Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA) unit installed on a Gerbera-series UAV. CRPAs are specialised antenna arrays that help protect GPS receivers from interference, spoofing, and jamming. This particular model, featuring four antennas, was first observed on the Shahed-136 UAV and has since been routinely seen fitted to Gerbera-series UAVs. An alternative array, with six antenna elements, has also been observed, reflecting the varied and ever-evolving state of electronic warfare in Ukraine. (ARES)
OSMP1641
Analyst Note:
A Gerbera-series UAV is pictured here being carried by just two Ukrainian soldiers. This highlights the Gerbera’s lightweight design—the airframe is mostly constructed from Styrofoam and wood, which saves on both weight and cost. This particular example does not bear signs of significant damage, suggesting that it either malfunctioned or was brought down by EW and crashed. (ARES)
OSMP1644
Analyst Note:
This image shows an A40 Pro camera, manufactured by the Chinese company Viewpro UAV and design specifically for use in UAVs. The black box to the right of the camera is the control box which manages video output, camera control, and power. The manufacturer claims this model has a 40× optical zoom, AI detection and tracking, and 3-axis gyro-stabilisation. The company further claims that it can customise the onboard AI recognition based on “target characteristics” provided by the client. Numerous Gerberas fitted with this model of camera are known to have been recovered by Ukrainian forces, although it is by no means the only camera model in use. (ARES)
OSMP1649
Analyst Note:
This image shows the back surface of a wireless communications module contained within a downed Gerbera UAV. Although labeled as an HX-50 model designed for fixed locations, Ukrainian military analysis indicates this is an XK-F358 mesh-network module more suitable for use in UAVs. See OSMP1646 for further details. (ARES)
OSMP1646
Analyst Note:
This image shows the front and interior surfaces of a wireless communications module recovered from a downed Gerbera UAV. Although labelled as an HX-50 industrial wireless modem (compatible with WiFi and 5G/4G networks and designed for fixed locations), analysis by Ukrainian military sources indicates that this component is, in fact, an XK-F358 mesh-network module which offers significantly more capabilities. Manufactured and sold by Shenzhen Xingkai Technology Co., Ltd., these modules are designed for, amongst other things, use in robots and unmanned vehicles. Gerbera UAVs have been found operating on a wide variety of frequencies and networks, and this type of module is well-suited to this use. (ARES)
OSMP1645
Analyst Note:
Pictured is a navigation/GPS module recovered from a downed Gerbera UAV. This particular model is used with the 4-antenna CRPA module seen in OSMP1648. The four RX ports on the bottom are normally directly connected to the CRPA (antenna) module, with other connections made to the UAV’s flight controller and power sources. Some Gerberas have been recovered with CRPA modules bearing a different number of antennas; different navigation modules have been observed on these. (ARES)
OSMP1655
Analyst Note:
This munition remnant is marked with a manufacturer’s CAGE Code (“MFR CAGE CODE: 62313”) which indicates it was produced by Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor that makes GMLRS missiles. (ARES)
OSMP1660
Analyst Note:
This remnant shows a munition component marked with the CAGE Code for a sub-contractor who produced part of a larger munition. “64344” is the code for Unique Electronics Inc., a known sub-contractor working on Lockheed Martin’s GMLRS contract. One of the parts they make is the “CABLE ASSEMBLY W459“, as seen in this image. (ARES)
OSMP1535
Analyst Note:
This image shows the three lenses that form the new version of the Kh-101 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC) system. (The older version only had a single lens.) DSMAC systems take digital images of the ground as the missile passes overhead, and then compare those images to pre-captured images stored in the onboard memory. The DSMAC corrects the flight path as needed based on differences between the two sets of images. (ARES)
OSMP1531
Analyst Note:
This image shows the second warhead present in some variants of the Kh-101 cruise missile. The inclusion of this additional warhead requires a smaller fuel tank in the missile, offering increased explosive weight in exchange for a reduced maximum range. (ARES)
OSMP1528
Analyst Note:
This image shows a Russian spherical submunition of unknown designation. Whilst this specific example was delivered by a cluster munition variant of the Kh-59MK2 missile, this submunition is known to also be delivered by variants of the Kh-69. A similar, but different, spherical submunition is delivered by some variants of the Kh-101. (ARES)
OSMP1400
Analyst Note:
This image shows a variety of small air-delivered munitions that have been developed specifically for deployment via UAV. Some of these appear to be original designs, whilst others have been made by modifying existing munitions. This entry reflects those munitions outlined with the red box, but all of the munitions are generally of similar in size and format, and all have tailfin assemblies intended to orient the munition as it falls, just like more traditional air-delivered bombs. (ARES)
OSMP1401
Analyst Note:
The munition in this image has been integrated into a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) small UAV. This UAV (‘drone’) adds powered and guided delivery and converts the munition into a guided missile—regardless of the original, intended delivery method. (ARES)
OSMP1402
Analyst Note:
This image shows three sets of three PTM-1 series scatterable anti-vehicle mines taped together. While these mines have likely been repurposed from their original delivery munition to be delivered via UAV, this cannot be confirmed based off this image alone. (ARES)
OSMP1403
Analyst Note:
The warhead of the OWA UAV indicated in this image cannot be positively identified from this photograph alone. It appears to be the warhead section of either an OG-9 series or OG-15 series high explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) projectile, with a GO-2 or similar impact fuze fitted in the nose. (ARES)
OSMP1399
Analyst Note:
This image shows four PFM-1 series anti-personnel landmines retained by a release mechanism to enable deployment via UAV. Ordinarily, PFM-1 series and other ‘scatterable mines’ are deployed via carrier munitions or dedicated mine-dispensing devices. In Ukraine and other conflicts, these mines have often been removed from their original carrier munitions in order that they may be delivered via UAV. (ARES)
OSMP1121
Analyst Note:
This image shows three different warheads developed by Russia for the Shahed-136/Geran-2 one-way attack (OWA) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), each of which differ from the original warhead designed by Iran for the Shahed-136. Left: A thermobaric explosive warhead; Middle: TBBCh-50M, a thermobaric explosive warhead; Right: OFZBCh-50, a high explosive warhead with an incendiary effect. Each of these warheads is also fitted with a fragmentation liner to increase the fragmentation effect generated when the warhead detonates. Some of the fragmentation liners may contain zirconium, a metal which is ignited when the warhead detonates, providing an additional incendiary effect. (ARES)
OSMP1177
Analyst Note:
This image shows the copper cone of the shaped charge located at the front of the warhead fitted to a Shahed-131. The Ukrainian armed forces have recorded that the cone measures 111 mm in diameter and 162 mm in depth. The warhead is lined with cubic pre-formed fragments of 7 mm in diameter. The explosive content of the warhead is estimated to be between 10 and 15 kg. (ARES)
OSMP875
Analyst Note:
This image shows a remnant of the aft motor section, which includes the venturi nozzle, of a North Korean KN-23/KN-24/Hwasong-11 series missile. The KN-23/KN-24/Hwasong-11 has a generally similar appearance to the Russian 9M7 ‘Iskander’ series of ballistic missiles, but has differences in performance and in some aspects of the construction. (ARES)